| In the early morning of 13 January 1944, Tennessee set
her course for Hawaii with Tasks Unit 53.5.1 and anchored in Lahaina Roads,
off Maui, on the 21st. That day, the ship was inspected by a group headed
by Undersecretary of the Navy James Forrestal. On the 29th, Tennessee,
with Forrestal on board, headed for the Marshalls. |
| D-Day was set for 31 January 1944. As one attack force landed
on the unoccupied Majuro atoll, the major force approached Kwajalein.
Tennessee,
Pennsylvania
(BB-38) and two destroyers took up their stations 2,900 yards to the east
of the atoll. At 0625, Tennessee catapulted off her observation
floatplanes; and at 0701, she began throwing 14-inch salvoes at Japanese
pill boxes on Roi Island. Her two forward turrets were busily engaged when
fire had to be checked to allow carrier dive-bombers to strike the island.
Japanese antiaircraft guns opened up on the planes. As soon as the attackers
were clear of the area, the ship demolished the enemy guns with two three-gun
salvoes. The 5-inch battery then opened up on beach defenses. Main and secondary
guns continued to pound Roi and adjacent Namur until noon, the high point
of the morning coming when the guns of Mobile (CL-63) detonated a
Japanese ammunition dump on Namur and sent an enormous mushroom of thick
black smoke into the air. At midday, Tennessee retired form the firing
area to recover and service her spotting planes. Following a welcome midday
meal served to the crew at their battle stations, the battleship returned
to the fighting and shelled Roi and Namur through the afternoon. At 1700,
Tennessee turned away to screen supporting escort carriers for the
night. |
| While the fire support ships pounded Roi and Namur on the 31st,
marines captured five small nearby islands; and the northern passage into
Kwajalein lagoon was cleared for ships to pass in. On 1 February,
Tennessee and
Colorado
(BB-45), with Mobile and Louisville, were back in their assigned
area to the eastward and commenced firing at 0708. The ships pounded Namur
through the morning; marines began to land on both islands at about noon;
and Tennessee and her unit continued supporting fire until 1245. Roi
fell quickly, but Namur's defenders were well dug in and fought fiercely
until the early afternoon of 2 February. |
| Later that day, the battleship entered Kwajalein lagoon. Vice
Admiral Raymond Spruance and Rear Admiral Richard Conolly, commander of the
Roi-Namur invasion force, visited Mr. Forrestal on board Tennessee;
the Undersecretary and his party then went ashore to inspect the newly seized
islands and departed the following day by seaplane. |
| Useful lessons were learned from this operation. Since the Navy
had won command of the surface and in the air around the landing area, gunfire
support ships could close their objective and fire at whet was for a battleship,
virtually point-blank ranges. The heavy, short-range fire of the supporting
gunfire ships "met the most sanguine expectations" of the assaulting marines
and foretold the shape of operations to come. |
| By 7 February, the whole Kwajalein atoll was in American hands;
and preparations began for the capture of Eniwetok atoll, at the northwest
end of the Marshalls group in the direction of the Marianas. Prewar Japanese
security had been tight, and little was known about the atoll, but aerial
photographs and a Japanese chart found in a beached enemy ship on one of
Kwajalein's small islets gave planners enough to work with. |
| Tennessee arrived at Majuro on 7 February to take on ammunition
and supplies before returning to Kwajalein. On the afternoon of the 15th,
she sailed for Eniwetok with Colorado, Pennsylvania and transports
carrying Army troops and marines. Ships of the fast carrier force screened
their approach, and cruisers and destroyers opened the action on the morning
of 17 February by bombarding Eniwetok Island, on the southwest side of the
circular atoll, and the smaller islands flanking the selected entry to the
lagoon, Deep Passage. Minesweepers cleared Deep Passage and the nearby, though
shallower, Wide Passage; and at 09915, Tennessee led the transport
convoy into the lagoon and headed for the atoll's northern island of Engebi.
The battleship bombarded Engebi while landing forces went ashore on neighboring
islets to site artillery pieces. Her 5-inch guns were active during the early
evening in support of a marine reconnaissance company which approached Engebi
to plant marker buoys for the next day's assault waves and to acquaint themselves
with the beaches. During the night, Tennessee drew off into the lagoon
as light field pieces from the newly captured ground harassed Engebi's defenders.
The pre-landing bombardment began at 0700 the next morning, and
Tennessee joined in at 0733. The first wave went ashore at 0844 and,
with the help of supporting ships and planes, had Engebi in their hands by
late afternoon. |
| The atoll was not yet secure. Japanese defenders on Eniwetok and
Parry Islands had carefully dug in and camouflaged their positions. Transports
and landing vehicles carried a force of soldiers and marines to the southern
end of the lagoon and, after a preparatory bombardment; the troops went ashore
on Eniwetok. There had not been enough time to give the island a satisfactory
softening, and progress was slow. |
| Tennessee spent the day anchored 5,500 yards north of the
island, but her services were not called for until night fell. During the
night, Army troops called several times for illumination. Destroyers played
their searchlights over Japanese held areas, while Tennessee's 5-inch
guns fired large numbers of star shells. The fight for Eniwetok went on into
the afternoon of 21 February, but Tennessee's efforts had, by then,
been diverted to Parry Island. |
| Parry, at the mouth of Deep Channel, was defended by more than
1,300 well-trained, carefully entrenched Japanese troops. The assault plan
called for a careful preliminary working over with bombs and gunfire, and
nearby marine light howitzers began to shell Parry from a nearby islet in
the evening of 20 February while carrier planes carried out repeated attacks.
Tennessee and Pennsylvania took up positions 900 yards off
Parry during the morning of the 20th and, at 1204, began to blast the
island. |
| The bombardment continued through the 21st, ships and planes taking
their turns. Gun crews paused for a "breather" while planes from the escort
carriers unloaded their ordnance, and then resumed their work.
Colorado's 16-inch rifles added to the weight of Tennessee
and Pennsylvania's 14-inch fire, and Louisville and
Indianapolis
(CA-35) joined in with their 8-inch turret guns. Tennessee was firing
at so short a range that, during the afternoon of the 20th, she was able
to take on beach defenses with her 40-millimeter guns. |
| The final shelling, on the morning of 22 February, kicked up a
dense mixture of smoke and dust as the landing craft went in.
Tennessee's heavy guns checked fire at 0852 when the first amphibian
tractors were 300 yards from the beach, and her 40-millimeters took up the
fire until the vehicles landed. Ships' guns continued to provide support
during the first two hours of land fighting but ceased firing as the troops
expanded their foothold and advanced across the island. By afternoon, Parry
was secured, and Eniwetok atoll was securely in American hands. |
| On 23 February 1944, Tennessee sailed for Majuro. Here,
she joined New
Mexico (BB-40),
Mississippi
(BB-41) and
Idaho (BB-42).
Under the command of Rear Admiral Robert M. Griffin, the battleships sortied
from Majuro on 15 March with two escort carriers and a screen of fifteen
destroyers. |
| Their objective was the Japanese air and naval base at Kavieng,
at the northern end of New Ireland. The Bismarck Archipelago -- the two large
islands of New Britain and New Ireland -- lie just to the east of New Guinea.
Rabaul, the by-low legendary Japanese operating base, is at the eastern end
of New Britain, just across a narrow channel from New Ireland. About 240
miles northwest of Rabaul, across the Bismarck Sea, is the small Admiralty
Island group. Another small island, Emirau, lies northwest of New Ireland
and east of the Admiralties. Southeast from Rabaul, the Solomons chain extended
for more than five hundred miles. Since the first landing on Guadalcanal
in August 1942, the chain had been slowly climbed in a series of strongly
contested actions by sea, land and air. By the end of 1943, American forces
held a strong foothold on Bougainville, little more than 200 miles from
Rabaul. |
| The final steps in Rabaul's encirclement and isolation were planned
for the spring of 1944. Kavieng was to have been captured early in April,
but the success of the land-based air offensive against Rabaul convinced
Admiral Nimitz that it would be more profitable to occupy un-defended Emirau
instead, sending the bombardment ships against Kavieng to convince the Japanese
that a landing on New Ireland was planned. |
| Admiral Griffin, accordingly, headed for Kavieng and, on the morning
of 20 March 1944, approached the harbor. Rainsqualls and low-hanging clouds
shrouded the area as Tennessee and the other gunfire ships zigzagged
toward New Ireland. The island appeared through the overcast at about 0700.
Tennessee launched her spotting planes an hour later, and they were
soon out of sight in the rain and mist. By 0905, the range to the target
was within 15,000 yards, and the battleships opened a deliberate fire. Steaming
at 15 knots, Tennessee dropped single 14-inch rounds and two or three
gun salvoes on Kavieng as the bombardment force slowly closed the range.
Poor visibility made gunfire spotting difficult, and the pace of firing was
held down to avoid wasting ammunition. |
| Tennessee was about 7,500 yards from the island when her
lookouts reported gun flashes from the beach, quickly followed by shell splashes
just off the starboard bow and close to one of her screening destroyers.
At 0928, Tennessee's port 5-inch guns opened rapid continuous fire
at the coastal battery, estimated to consist of four to six 4-inch guns.
A 180-degree turn brought the battleship's starboard secondaries to bear,
and the duel continued. The Japanese gunners began to get the range, and
some projectiles hit close aboard on the starboard beam while others came
similarly close to Idaho. Tennessee was straddled several times
and drew away form the shore at 18 knots before checking fire at 0934. Reducing
speed to 15 knots and turning back to firing position, Tennessee reopened
fire at 0936. Her main and secondary batteries pounded the enemy guns for
10 minutes, and nothing more was heard from the Japanese guns. For the next
three hours, the ships steamed back and forth off Kavieng, shelling the Japanese
airfield and shore facilities. Other coastal gun positions were sighted,
but the battleship's 14-inch fire silenced them before they could get off
a round. Visibility continued to be a problem; observers in the ships'
floatplanes could not get a clear view of the targets. When the 5-inch guns
were firing at targets in wooded areas, spotters in the ship's gun directors
could not observe hits in the heavy foliage. More that once, rounds had to
be dropped in the water to obtain a definite point of reference before "walking"
fire onto the desired target. |
| The bombardment ended at 1235, Tennessee turned away and
made rendezvous with the covering escort carriers as Admiral Halsey wired
his "congratulations on your effective plastering of Kavieng." This diversion
had had its effect. While Admiral Griffin's battleships blasted Kavieng,
Emirau had been seized without opposition. Pausing at Purvis Bay and Efate,
Tennessee arrived at Pearl Harbor on 16 April to refurbish and prepare
for her next tasks. |
| Operation "Forager," the assault on the Marianas, was planned
as a two pronged thrust. Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner's Task Force 51
was organized into a Northern Attack Force (TF 52), under his command, and
a Southern Attack Force (TF 53) under Rear Admiral Richard Conolly. While
TF 52 attacked Saipan and nearby Tinian, Conolly's TF 53 was aimed at Guam.
The bombardment and fire support force arrayed for this operation included
Tennessee and 7 other older battleships, 11 cruisers, and about 26
destroyers. These ships were divided in two fire support groups.
Tennessee, with
California
(BB-44),
Maryland
(BB-46) and Colorado, was assigned to Fire Support Group One (TG 52.17)
under Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf. |
| The Northern Attack Force assembled at Hawaii in mid-May 1944.
After rehearsals off Maui and Kahoolawe, Fire Support Group One sailed for
Kwajalein while the transports staged at Eniwetok. On 10 June 1944,
Tennessee and her tasks group departed Kwajalein, bound for
Saipan. |
| Early on 13 June, as the force approached the Marianas, sings
of Japanese activity began to appear. A patrol plane reported sighting a
surfaced submarine some 20 miles ahead and attacked it. Another plane shot
down a land based Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" which had been railing along 10
miles astern of the ships. Another submarine contact was reported to port
of the formation, and screening destroyers dropped depth charges. During
the 13th, Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee's Task Group 58.7 -- seven new fast
battleships of the North Carolina, South Dakota and Iowa
classes -- temporarily detached from Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force
58 -- hurled a furious bombardment at Saipan. |
| Throughout the following night, lookouts reported gun flashes
on the horizon, and escorting destroyers attacked suspected submarines. General
quarters were sounded at 0400 on 14 June as the old battleships drew near
to Saipan. Near the horizon, a Japanese cargo ship, set afire by the guns
of Melvin (DD-680), burned brightly. Shortly before dawn, Oldendorf's
battleships passed to the north of Saipan as the second fire-support group
steamed through Saipan Channel at the southern end of the island. The southern
group opened fire at 0539. Nine minutes later, Tennessee began a
methodical bombardment of the selected landing area, the southern portion
of Saipan's west coast, in support of minesweepers carrying out an assault
sweep on the landing zone. Enemy coastal guns had fired a few shots at
Oldendorf's ships as they rounded the northern tip of the island, and attacking
carrier planes as well as the ships' observation float-planes encountered
heavy antiaircraft fire. Maryland drew fire from a battery concealed
on a tiny islet off Tanapag harbor. She and California turned on this
foe and soon silenced it. |
| Released from this duty, Tennessee sailed southward to
the area of Agingan Point, at the southwest corner of Saipan and the southern
end of the designated landing area. Underwater demolition teams (UDT) approached
the beach in small craft to reconnoiter the landing beaches and to plant
radar beacons which would provide reference points to the next day's landing.
Tennessee closed to 3,000 yards of Agingan Point and, at 0831, opened
up with 14-inch, 5-inch and 40-millimeter batteries. Some smoldering powder
grains from the 5-inch, guns fell on the port side of the battleship's
quarterdeck and burst into flame, but were quickly extinguished. Japanese
guns dropped shells near the UDT's as mortars and machine guns joined in;
at about 0920, projectile splashes began to appear near the supporting ships
as batteries on nearby Tinian opened fire. Cleveland (CL-55) was
straddled, and California and Braine (DD-630) took hits.
Tennessee aimed her batteries fire at the defenders who were opposing
the UDT's and her turret guns fired at Tinian. Shortly before noon, she moved
to the northwest to bombard Japanese fortifications on Afetna Point, near
the center of the landing zone. At 1331, the ship ceased fire, and withdrew
from the firing area to recover her seaplanes, later closing Wadleigh
(DD-689) and Brooks (APD-10) to take on board five wounded UDT men
for treatment. She joined the rest of her fire support group and took night
stations to the west of Saipan. |
| D-Day on Saipan was 15 June 1944. Circling to the north of the
island, well out of sight from shore during the last hours of darkness, the
assault force was off the landing beaches by dawn. Reserve landing forces
staged an elaborate feint off Tanapag harbor, hoping to induce the Japanese
to reinforce its defenses before the actual landing took place further south.
At 0430, the pre-landing bombardment began. Tennessee joined in at
0540 with a heavy barrage farm her main, secondary and 40-millimeter guns
from 3,000 yards west of Agingan Point. At 0542, the landing craft and amphibian
tractors of the landing force began to load and assemble for the movement
to shore. Gunfire was lifted at 0630 to allow carrier planes to bombard the
island's defenses, resuming at 0700. At 0812, the assault waves headed for
the beach. The first went ashore at 0844 and met heavy opposition. The
pre-landing bombardment, though prolonged and intense, had left much of the
Japanese defenses still able to fight; and, as the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions
landed on a 4 mile front south of Garapan, they found that much still remained
to be done. |
| Tennessee's assault station was off the southern end of
the landing beach. During the first wave's approach, her guns covered that
end of the objective to prepare the way for the right hand elements of the
4th Division. She checked fire as the troops neared the beach, resuming it
a few minutes later as the marines fought to establish themselves ashore.
Japanese 4.7-inch field guns, in place in a cave on Tinian, opened on
Tennessee. The battleship commenced counter attack firing, but the
third enemy salvo scored three hits, all of which burst on impact. One projectile
knocked out a 5-inch twin gun mount; the second struck the ship's side, while
the third tore a whole in the after portion of main deck and sprayed fragments
into the wardroom below. An intensive fire inside the disabled gun mount
was subdued in two minutes by repair parties and men from nearby gun crews;
the hit to the hull damaged external blister plating, but was prevented from
inflicting further damage by the battleship's heavy belt armor. Eight men
were killed by projectile fragments, while 25 more were wounded by fragments
and flash burns. Tennessee's damages did not prevent her from delivering
call fire to help break up a developing Japanese counterattack near Agingan
Point before leaving the firing line to make emergency repairs. During the
afternoon and night, she took station to screen assembled transports. Four
Japanese dive-bombers attacked nearby ships at 1845, and Tennessee's
5-inch guns briefly engaged them but claimed no hits. That evening,
Tennessee buried her dead. Tokyo radio claimed victory in the battle
for Saipan, stating that they had sunk a battleship, which they identified
as "probably the New
Jersey." |
| The "sunken" Tennessee returned to Saipan Channel early
the next day. Several Japanese counterattacks had been stopped during the
night, and Tennessee's supporting fire assisted the marines in organizing
and consolidating their beachhead. During the evening, the first troops of
the Army's 27th Infantry Division began to come ashore; another counterattack,
this one involving tanks, was turned back during the night of 16 and 17
June. |
| The original plan had called for landings on Guam on the 18th.
However, during the afternoon of the 15th and early hours of the 16th, Admiral
Spruance was advised that Japanese warships were at sea, off the Philippines,
heading for the Marianas. The Japanese plan for the defense of these vital
islands called for their garrison to hold out while a naval force mounted
a counterstroke to destroy the American invasion fleet. By the morning of
the 16th, Spruance decided to cancel the attack on Guam while continuing
to fight for Saipan and disposing his naval forces for battle. The fast carrier
force was sent to counter the Japanese thrust, while the fire-support battleships
were to be deployed to the west of Saipan tin calls the Japanese should evade
Task Force 58 and direct a surface thrust at the island. Tennessee
held station west of Saipan with the other elderly battleships as the two
fleets groped toward each other about 150 miles away. |
| On the 19th, Mitscher's task force clashed with Admiral Jisaburo
Ozawa's Mobil Fleet in what was to be called the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot."
By this time, American carrier operations had attained a high level of excellence
while the Japanese air arm, its experienced airmen mostly lost during the
long campaigns of 1942 and 1943, had to make do with unskilled pilots. The
result was striking. In more than eight hours of intense aerial combat, more
than 300 Japanese planes were knocked down, most of these by carrier fighters.
By the 20th, counterattacking American planes and submarines had sent carriers
Hiyo, Shokaku and Taiho to the bottom. Thus, Japan's last serious carrier
offensive operation ended in disaster. |
| Ozawa's fleet never got close enough to Saipan for
Tennessee and her cousins to be called upon. On the 20th, she fueled
east of Saipan as the Japanese carrier force headed westward. The next day,
she was back on the gun line to blast gun positions on Manigassa Island,
off Tanapag harbor. Call fire occupied the afternoon, as she took on several
targets near Garapan. Tennessee's 14-inch guns commenced firing at
0555 the next day, pounding Garapan from 6,000 yards. Shell hits on the battered
town raised clouds of smoke and dust, reminding the battleship's gunners
of the Aleutian murk. Fire was shifted onto Mount Tapotchau, east of Garapan,
before being returned to Garapan to assist the American troops who were working
their way into the southern part of town. |
| On the night of 22 June, Tennessee got underway for Eniwetok
where Hector (AR-7) repaired her battle damage as the fight for Saipan
ground to its end on 9 July. Her next destination was Guam. Departing Eniwetok
on 16 July with California, she joined Rear Admiral Ainsworth's Southern
Fire Support Group (TG 53.5) off Guam in the afternoon of the 19th. The next
day she joined in a systematic bombardment began on the 8th, which was carefully
planned to soften up the enemy's defenses while avoiding harm to the island's
friendly Chamorro population. Tennessee launched her planes; and,
at 0742, her turret guns opened fire while the 5-inch battery raked nearby
Cabras Island. The ship slowly maneuvered to a position north of Asan Point,
several miles north of Apra Harbor, where one of two landing beaches was
sited. UDT's scouted the beaches while plains laid smoke screens to cover
their movements, and the ships' guns kept the Japanese defenders occupied.
Firing ceased at midday and resumed late in the afternoon, as
Tennessee continued to hammer Japanese positions north of Apra. |
| Shortly after dawn on 21 July, the bombardment ships again took
up their work. Tennessee renewed her attentions to Cabras Island as
the assault waves formed and headed for shore and continued to provide support
during the first stage of the landing. At 1003, she ceased firing. Late that
day, she put to sea with California and Colorado and returned to Saipan on
22 July. |
| Tennessee anchored in Tanapag harbor to replenish ammunition
before taking up her night position to the west of Tinian. At 0607y on 23
July, she opened fire on the waterfront area of Tinian Town, as part of a
deception scheme intended to convince the strong Japanese garrison that the
landing would take place at Sunharon Bay, on the southwest coast of the island.
A UDT even made a daylight reconnaissance of the beaches to strengthen the
impression and Tennessee's guns supported the frogmen. Fire paused
around midday and resumed again in the afternoon before the ship retired
to her night position off the island. |
| Early in the morning of the 24th, Tennessee took up her
position off Tinian's northwest coast with California,
Louisville (CA-28) and several destroyers. From 2,500 yards offshore,
the ships opened fire at 0532, ceasing fire as the first wave closed the
beach at 0747. For the rest of the day, the ship stood by to deliver fire
if needed, they retired for the night. In the morning of 25 July,
Tennessee relieved California as the "duty ship" to furnish
call fire upon request from the beach. Through the 25th and 26th,
Tennessee delivered supporting fire by day and star shell by night.
After returning briefly to Saipan to replenish on the 27th, the battleship
was back on the firing line on the 28th, and her fire supported the advancing
marines through the afternoon. Following replenishment at Saipan on the 29th,
Tennessee began the 30th in support of marines advancing southward
through Tinian Town. In the early morning, one of her observation planes
collided in midair with a land-based marine OY-1 spotting plane. Both aircraft
plummeted to earth behind Japanese lines and burst into flames; the crews
of both were killed. |
| Firing continued through that day and into the 31st, as the marines
crowded the last defenders into the southern tip of the island. At 0830 on
31 July, Tennessee's guns fell silent, and she returned to Saipan
with her task accomplished. On the evening of 2 August, she arrived off Guam
to resume fire support duty. Rejoining Ainsworth's gunfire task group, she
delivered call fire and illumination until 8 August when she joined
California and Louisville for the voyage to Eniwetok and thence
to Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides. The ships arrived at Espiritu Santo
on 24 August. On 2 September, Tennessee arrived at Tulagi for a brief
period of amphibious support training. |
| Meanwhile, decisions had been made which would reshape the allied
offensive in the western Pacific. Meeting at Pearl Harbor in July 1944, President
Roosevelt, Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur had finally reached an agreement
that the Philippines were to be liberated, not merely bypassed. After further
discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved landings beginning at Mindanao,
continuing north through Leyte, then taking either Luzon or Formosa and Amoy.
During early September, Task Force 38 hit Japanese bases from the Palaus
to the Visayas, inflicting considerable damage. Surprisingly little resistance
was encountered by the roving carriers, leading to a conclusion that enemy
air strength was virtually nonexistent. Nimitz, MacArthur and Halsey agreed
that this eliminated any need for a network of southern air bases to support
the capture of the Philippines. Proposed landings on Yap and Mindanao were
scrapped, although Morotai was invaded in September and preparations were
made for an assault on the Palaus before bypassing the southern Philippines
and going into Leyte. |
| The Palaus were to be Tennessee's next objective. This
group is not an atoll, but an elongated cluster of islands just north of
the Equator and at the western end of the Carolinas. The group is about 110
miles long from small islands and reefs to the north through the large island
of Babelthuap to the small southern islands of Peleliu and Angaur. |
| The objectives of the assault force were Kossol Roads, a
reef-sheltered anchorage at the northern end of the chain, and the two southern
islands; the large Japanese garrison on Babelthuap was to be isolated and
left to its own devices. Planes and gunfire ships took turns pounding Peleliu
from the morning of 12 September until the assault waves went ashore on the
15th. The battle for that island was to be one of the most bitter of the
pacific war, and organized resistance was not eliminated until November,
at a heavy cost in lives. |
| Tennessee's target was the smaller island of Angaur, a
few miles south of Peleliu. On the morning of 12 September, Tennessee
and Pennsylvania, with four light cruisers and five destroyers, began a prolonged
bombardment as carrier aircraft did their share. |
| The flash and roar of bombs and gunfire from ships and planes
attacking Peleliu were plain on the horizon as Tennessee closed Angaur
early on 12 September. The battleship opened fire at 0632, hurling 14-inch
shells at targets ashore from 14,000 yards. Through the morning and afternoon,
her guns hit coast-defense positions and antiaircraft sites. During the
afternoon, minesweepers cleared the approaches to the beaches. By this time,
Tennessee was only 3,750 yards from shore, and her 40-millimeters
had joined in. A prominent masonry lighthouse on the west coast of Angaur
was ordered destroyed to keep the Japanese from using it as a gunfire observation
point. Twelve 14-inch rounds were aimed at it, scarring the area and scoring
three hits, but the tower remained standing. Other targets absorbed
Tennessee's attention for the next three days. Tennessee stood
by off Peleliu during the morning of the 15th in case her guns should be
needed to assist the assault landing. When this work was completed, she returned
on the evening of 16 September to finish off the stubborn tower before the
next morning's scheduled landings. As the ship's turret guns trained out
on the target, a 6-inch projectile from Denver (CL-58) screamed in
from the far side of the island and sent the lighthouse crashing down in
a cloud of smoke and dust. |
| Ships and carrier planes pounded the island for five days before
Army troops of the 81st Infantry Division went ashore on Angaur on the morning
of 17 September. Tennessee's guns supported the soldiers through the
19th. By the morning of 20 September, organized resistance was at an end;
and the battleship steamed away from the island to Kossol Roads to refuel
and to take on ammunition. On 28 September, she arrived at Manus to prepare
for her next operation. |
| Tennessee weighed anchor on 12 October and set her course
for Leyte Gulf. Under the supreme command of General MacArthur, Vice Admiral
Thomas Kinkaid's 7th Fleet carried two Army corps toward the invasion area.
Their objectives were two landing zones on the eastern coast of Leyte. A
Northern Attack Force (TF 78) under Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey was aimed
at Tacloban, while Vice Admiral Theodore Wilson commanded TG 9, the Southern
Attack Force whose target was Dulag. The old battleships wee divided between
two fire support units. Tennessee, with California and
Pennsylvania, sailed with the Dulag attack force under Rear Admiral
Oldendorf. |
| During its approach to the Philippines, the invasion force was
alert for air and submarine attack; but none came. As the ships steamed under
hot, clear skies, their radios brought news of Task Force 38 as the fast
carriers ranged an arc from the Ryukyus to Formosa before turning on Japanese
air bases in Luzon and the central Philippines. Preliminary minesweeping
and bombardment, to clear the way into Leyte Gulf, began on the morning of
17 October 1944. The entrance to the gulf was secured, but the approaches
to the objective area were partially swept when Oldendorf, to avoid delaying
the operation, decided to order his ships into the gulf. At 0609 on the morning
of the 18th, Tennessee, with her fire support unit, entered the channel
between Homonhon and Dinagat islands. Paravanes streamed from her bows, and
marines were stationed in her upperworks to sink or explode floating mines.
The minesweepers continued their work as the heavy ships moved slowly up
Leyte Gulf. |
| Tennessee took up her position off Dulag before dawn on
19 October and, at 0645, began to bombard the landing area north of the town.
Her main battery opened up form 8.300 yards, and her secondaries chimed in
a few minutes later as she aimed at fortifications and antiaircraft gun
emplacements. Catmon Hill, a 1,000-foot elevation just inland, received
particular attention from the ships. Japanese planes were reported in the
offing, but the only attack came form a horizontal bomber that dropped one
bomb into the water near Honolulu (CL-48) before being knocked down
by gunfire. Heavy shelling continued through the afternoon, and the bombardment
ships took up night cruising stations off the mouth of Leyte Gulf. |
| The landings were scheduled for 20 October; and, at 0600,
Tennessee opened neutralization fire on the beaches. As the northern
force pounded Tacloban and went in to the attack, transports assembled off
Dulag and put the landing force into the water. Infantry landing craft armed
with heavy mortars (LCI(M)) began dropping shells on reverse slopes at 0915;
and, at 0930, the landing waves crossed the line of departure and moved for
the beach. At 0945, rocket firing landing craft (LCI(R)) began to hurl their
masses of explosive bombardment rockets at the beach defenses, and the first
troops went ashore 15 minutes later. Naval gunfire was shifted inland and
to the flanks to assist the landing troops as they began to carve out a
beachhead. The landing went well. During the afternoon, Honolulu was
again attacked, this time by a torpedo bomber, which scored a hit and forced
the cruiser to withdraw. Night air attacks were feared; a screen of destroyers
was placed around the ships in the gulf, smoke was generated, and much nervous
firing flared up in the darkness and caused some casualties. |
| The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, on noting the scale
of the operation being mounted against Leyte, had decided to make that island
the focus of a decisive naval counterstrike. The principal surface strength
of the Combined Fleet had gone to Lingga Roads, an anchorage in the Lingga
Archipelago off Sumatra at the southwest end of the South China Sea, to be
near their fuel supply since American submarines had made it increasingly
difficult to get oil through to Japan. The surviving carriers had returned
to the Inland Sea to train aircrews. Under the Japanese plan, dictated by
a combination of geography, logistics and the lack of adequate carrier aviation,
four widely separated forces were to converge on the area of Leyte Gulf in
an effort to destroy, at whatever cost, the American invasion force. |
| While the Japanese fleet set out for Leyte, Tennessee continued
her work off the beachhead. Fire support was not required from her for the
time being, but the increasing tempo of Japanese air activity in the area
required her to place herself where her antiaircraft guns could assist in
the defense of the assembled transports and cargo ships. In the evening of
21 October, while lying dead in the water in a smoke screen laid to protect
the shipping from attacking planes, Tennessee was rammed near the
stern by the transport War Hawk (AP-168). No one was injured, and
the battleship's tough hull was little harmed, but her orders for a night
fire support mission were cancelled |
| Matters continued to go well ashore, where the town of Tacloban
was captured and declared a temporary seat of the Philippine government.
Air defense, rather than shore bombardment, was still Tennessee's
mission; on the morning of the 24th, enemy planes sank an LCI(L) and damaged
a cargo ship before being driven off. A larger raid came in from several
directions before noon, hitting American positions on Leyte. The afternoon
was mostly quiet. A third attack occurred at 1700. As the enemy aircraft
drew away, the battleship's executive officer passed the electrifying word
that a Japanese naval task force was expected to try to enter Leyte Gulf
that night. The six old battleships of the fire support groups formed columns
and moved south to take up positions at the mouth of Surigao Strait, the
body of water between Leyte and Dinagat, which formed a southern entrance
to Leyte Gulf. |
| The Japanese forces set in motion some days earlier were now
approaching their objective. A force of four carriers and two converted
hermaphrodite "battleship-carriers" was steaming south from Japan towards
the Philippine Sea, while a small surface force under Admiral Shima had sailed
from Japanese waters heading for the Sulu Sea. Two striking forces of
battleships, cruisers and destroyers had sailed from Lingga Roads; north
of Borneo they separated. The larger force, under Admiral Kurita, passed
north o f Palawan (losing three cruisers to submarine attack) to transit
the Sibuyan Sea and emerge to the north of Samar. A smaller force, commanded
by Admiral Nishimura, turned to the south of Palawan and crossed the Sulu
Sea to pass between Mindanao and Leyte. Shima's orders directed him to support
Nishimura, and his force followed some miles behind Nishimura's. |
| If the Sho plan, as it was called, worked properly, Kurita would
approach Leyte Gulf from the north while Nishimura and Shima came up from
the south, catching the massed amphibious shipping in the jaws of a vise
and destroying it. Ozawa's force was toothless since prolonged heavy casualties
and an inadequate pilot training program had left the Imperial Navy with
few experienced carrier pilots. The carrier force advancing southward from
Japan carried only enough planes to make a convincing decoy; its job was
to lure Halsey's 3d Fleet to the north while the converging surface forces
did their job. |
| During the morning of 24 October, carrier planed sighted the three
Japanese groups in the Sulu and Sibuyan seas. Recognizing Kurita's as the
most powerful, Halsey directed the fast carriers' air groups against him
as the Japanese ships steamed across the Sibuyan Sea. With no air cover,
Kurita had to endure repeated bomb and torpedo attacks that forced one of
his cruisers to turn back with serious damage and, as the day ended, sank
the giant battleship Musashi. Complaining of the lack of air support,
Kurita turned back in mid afternoon; and this movement was reported to Halsey
by his pilots. |
| Early on the 24th, a Japanese scout plane from Luzon had spotted
Task Force 38 east of that island. All available land based planes were sent
against it, mortally wounding the light carrier Princeton (CVL-23).
Halsey concluded that the attackers were carrier-based. During the morning,
Ozawa's reconnaissance planes sighted Halsey's carriers; and an unproductive
air strike was launched against Task Force 38 at 1145. In the afternoon,
the Japanese carriers were sighted and, in the evening of 24 October, Halsey
ordered the fast carrier force to go after them. Shortly before sunset, Kurita
had again reversed course and was heading back in the direction of Leyte
Gulf; Halsey had been informed of this, but exaggerated reports of damage
inflicted by his planes led him to believe that the Japanese force had been
more grievously hurt than was the case. Judging that Kurita was too badly
crippled to do any harm to the ships in Leyte Gulf, Halsey continued north
through the night. By midnight the Japanese Center Force, as the American
commanders referred to it, was pushing, unobserved, toward San Bernardino
Strait before turning south toward Leyte Gulf. |
| Halsey had not sent his planes against the surface forces of Nishimura
and Shima, believing that Kinkaid's warships would be able to deal with them.
This was to be Oldendorf's job; and, in the evening of the 24th, he deployed
his six battleships across the northern end of Surigao Strait. Besides his
capital ships, Oldendorf had available 8 cruisers and 28 destroyers. These
were arranged toward the flanks, the destroyers placed in suitable position
to launch torpedo attacks. A great deal of shooting in support of the landing
operation had already occurred, and most of the shells remaining in the
battleship's magazines were thin-walled, high capacity bombardment ammunition
rather than armor piercing projectiles. Their handling-room crews carefully
arranged the projectile supply so that high-capacity shells would be ready
for use against anything smaller than a battleship. The big ships were directed
to hold their fire until the enemy was within 20,000 yards to insure as many
hits as possible. |
| The sea was smooth and the moonless night intensely dark as the
ships steamed slowly to and for along their assigned lines of position.
Tennessee quietly awaited her first action against her own kind. |
| All available 7th Fleet PT boats had been stationed in Surigao
Strait and along its approaches. At 2236, the first PT's made radar contact
with Nishimura. Successive torpedo attacks were launched as Nishimura entered
Surigao Strait and steamed north, with Shima trailing well behind; Nishimura
was annoyed but not injured, though one of Shima's cruisers took a torpedo
and had to drop out of the running. Shortly before 0300, Nishimura was well
into the strait and taking up battle formation when he was hit by a well-planned
torpedo attack by five American destroyers. The battleship Fuso was
hit and dropped out of formation; other torpedo spreads sank two Japanese
destroyers and crippled a third. Another torpedo struck, but did not stop,
Fuso's sistership Yamashiro. Ten minutes later, another destroyer
attack scored a second hit on Yamashiro. The disabled Fuso
had apparently been set afire by the torpedo that had hit her; her magazines
exploded at 0338 as
Arizona's
had on the morning of 7 December; and the two shattered halves of the battleship
slowly drifted back down the strait before sinking. |
| On board Tennessee, observers had seen distant flashes
of gunfire, star shells, and searchlights as the torpedo boats had destroyers
engaged the Japanese. Soon explosions could be heard. At 0302, the battleship's
radar picked up Nishimura's approach at nearly 44,000 yards and began to
track the lead ship. This was flagship, Yamashiro. With the cruiser
Mogami and destroyer Shigure, she was all that remained of
the first Japanese force. At 0351 Oldendorf ordered the flanking cruisers
to open fire and, at 0355, the battleships let fly from 20,500 yards. |
| Tennessee's forward turret fired a three-gun salvo, and
the rest of her 14-inch battery joined in. In this duel, Tennessee,
California and the recently arrived
West
Virginia (BB-48) had a considerable advantage over the other battleships.
During their wartime modernization, all three had received new Mark 34 main
battery directors provided with Mark 8 fire control radars and associated
modern gunfire computing equipment. The main batteries of the other ships
were still controlled by systems developed 20 years or more before and were
using earlier Mark 3 radars. This handicap showed in their shooting. Firing
in six-gun salvos to make careful use of her limited supply of armor-piercing
bullets before checking fire at 0408. The battle line had increased speed
to 15 knots before opening fire and as it drew near the eastern end of its
line of position, simultaneous turns brought the ships around to a westward
heading. California miscalculated her turn and cam sharply across
Tennessee's boy, narrowly avoiding a collision and fouling
Tennessee's line of fire for about five minutes. |
| The effect of this intense bombardment was awesome. As one of
Tennessee's crew described it, "when a ship fired there would be a
terrific whirling sheet of golden flame bolting across the sea, followed
by a massive thunder, and then three red balls would go into the sky;' up,
arch-over, and then down. When the salvoes found the target there would be
a huge shower of sparks, and after a moment a dull orange glow would appear.
This glow would increase, brighten and then slowly dull." Little of the enemy
could be seen from Tennessee. Occasionally, the vague outline of a
ship could be seen against the glare of an explosion; and, at one point,
the single stack and high "pagoda" foremast of Yamashiro could be
seen. Nishimura's three ships found themselves at the focus of a massive
crossfire of battleship and cruiser fire. By 0400, both of the larger Japanese
ships had been hit repeatedly as they gallantly attempted to return fire;
Mogami sorely damaged and her engineering plant crippled, had turned
back, and Yamashiro, burning intensely, came about to follow. Oldendorf
ordered gunfire to cease at 0409, after hearing that flanking destroyers
were being endangered by American gunfire. Yamashiro, still able to
make 15 knots after her frightful beating, was fatally hurt and, at 0419,
rolled over and sank with all but a few of her crew. Mogami was able
to draw out of radar range but had been slowed to a crawl. Shigure,
more or less overlooked and relatively undamaged, escaped southward. |
| Shima's force, following along in Nishimura's wake, was unaware
of when had befallen. When they were about halfway up Surigao Strait, they
sighted what seemed to be two flaming ships; these were the broken halves
of Fuso. Shima's two cruisers made a radar torpedo attack on what
they believed to be American ships but was, in fact, Hibuson Island. "The
island," as Samuel E. Morison remarked, "was not damaged." The Japanese admiral
decided that Nishimura's force had met with disaster and decided on a retreat.
As his ships turned to steam back, cruiser Nachi collided with limping,
burning Mogami, but both vessels were able to continue southward.
Collecting Shigure, the only other survivor of Nishimura's attack,
Shima retired back through the strait. Oldendorf sent some of his cruisers
and destroyers after him, and the patrolling PT's joined in. Fire was engaged
wit the stubborn Mogami, but she continued on her way only to be sunk
by carrier planes shortly afterward. Destroyer Asagumo, her bow blown
off by destroyer torpedoes during Nishimura's approach, was sighted and sent
to the bottom with her guns still firing. Oldendorf now received reports
that Kurita's "crippled " force had emerged from San Bernardino Strait and
joined action east of Samar with some of the supporting escort carrier force
stationed there. Planes were hurriedly drawn for another surface battle,
and Oldendorf's ships turned toward the northern entrance to Leyte Gulf to
defend the landing area. |
| Their services were, however, not needed. In an epic action off
Samar, the escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts of Rear Admiral
C. A. F. Sprague's "Taffy Three" put up so desperate a fight that Kurita
judged the odds against him hopeless and turned back. Halsey's carrier planes
and surface ships sank all four of Ozawa's decoy carriers, and a submarine
finished off a damaged cruiser. |
| The Battle for Leyte Gulf was over. The last major Japanese naval
counterstroke had been defeated, and Tennessee had had a share in
the last naval action fought by a battle line. |
| The next several days were quiet ones for Tennessee, though
the Japanese sent numerous land-based air strikes against Leyte Gulf. On
29 October, the battlewagon's crew was told that their next destination was
to be the Puget Sound Navy Yard. Late that day, she got underway for Ulithi
with West Virginia, Maryland and four cruisers. From there,
she proceeded to Pearl Harbor and thence to Bremerton where she entered the
shipyard on 26 November. |
|
