The Sinking of USS Indianapolis: Navy Department
Press Release, Narrative of the Circumstances of the Loss of USS Indianapolis, 23 February 1946

NARRATIVE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE

LOSS OF THE USS Indianapolis

Adequate understanding of the circumstances under which the USS Indianapolis was torpedoed and sunk, and in which delays resulted in the rescue of her survivors, requires some preliminary consideration of the overall situation in the Pacific at the time.
On April 1, 1945, following the recapture of the Philippines and the capture of Iwo Jima, United States Forces landed on Okinawa. Heavy fighting ashore on Okinawa continued until the 21st of June, when organized resistance ceased.
The victory ashore on Okinawa was made possible only by the continued support of all available units of the Pacific Fleet. Throughout the spring and summer of 1945, the Fleet continued to control the sea and air in the vicinity of Okinawa, but in so doing received heavy damage. This damage was received principally by destroyers, destroyer escorts, and other types of ships normally used for escort purposes. These units, which formed screens for our forces at sea and also for the forces ashore, were the principal targets for Kamikaze attack. The extent of the damage sustained in these types made it necessary to modify the escort procedures throughout the Pacific, so that damaged escorts might be returned to the navy yards for repair, and so that the escorts still available could be used in the most exposed areas and on assignments where they would contribute most to the overall safety of our forces, more particularly to the safety of the ships off Japan and the ships carrying troops.
The records of the period, from the beginning of the Okinawa operation almost until the end of the war, show clearly the concern which existed in this regard. Destroyers and destroyer escorts were brought to the Central Pacific from the Atlantic and from the North Pacific. Ships were sailed unescorted in the more remote areas. Priority was given to the repair of escort types in our navy yards and a determined effort was made to improve the escort situation in preparation for the invasion of Japan during which there could be anticipated a repetition of the conditions under which such heavy damage to escorts was sustained off Okinawa.
During July we were engaged in consolidating our position at Okinawa and in sustained attacks on Japan itself with both carrier task forces and shore-based air forces in order to create the conditions prerequisite for invasion. The Third Fleet was actively engaged in attacking Honshu. The Twentieth Air Force was bombing Honshu. Naval aircraft from the Ryukyus were ranging over the East China Sea and along the coasts of Kyushu and Southern and Central Korea. The Far East Air Force was moving its personnel and equipment up from the Philippines to Okinawa and was increasing the weight of its attack on Kyushu.
At the end of July the carrier task forces were delivering very heavy attacks which destroyed many Japanese aircraft and which practically completed the elimination of the Japanese fighting ships in their home ports. Important conferences were going on in Manila between the staffs of Fleet Admiral Nimitz and General of the Army MacArthur in connection with plans for the invasion and alternate plans for the occupation of Japan in case of an early surrender. Extensive mine sweeping operations were in progress in the East China Sea. Rescue operations for downed carrier pilots and B-29 pilots were in progress south of Japan. There were approximately 700 fighting ships and about 400 merchant ships at sea in the Western Pacific. Radio traffic in the Joint Communications Center at Guam averaged 18,000 messages a day. The responsible officers in the Pacific Fleet were devoting their time and energy to accelerating the tempo of the campaign and to increasing the pressure on Japan in order to bring the war to a conclusion, and specifically, to pound the Japanese into submission without the necessity for a costly invasion.
On May 1, 1945, the USS Indianapolis had entered the Navy Yard, Mare Island, California, for overhaul. Her overhaul was completed and she was reported ready for sea on July 16, 1945.
Although all preparations had been made to give the vessel a post-repair shakedown period in San Diego, California, preparatory to her rejoining the Fleet in the combat area, assignment to a mission of greater importance necessitated the postponement of this period of refresher training until a later date.
While in the Navy Yard, there had been a great number of changes among the officers attached to the vessel and a turnover in her enlisted complement in excess of 25 percent.
Every advantage was taken of opportunities to send both officers and enlisted men to schools and other instruction, while in the Navy Yard; and when reported ready for sea, the ship was well organized and the training of personnel was progressing satisfactorily.
The Indianapolis proceeded unescorted at high speed from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor, thence to Tinian, where special cargo (atomic bomb parts) was landed. A great many passengers were transported to Pearl Harbor and a lesser number beyond that point. These factors interfered somewhat with the schedule of training under way, but instruction was continued, general drills were held daily and at least one battle problem was held during this passage.
Upon completion of unloading at Tinian, the Indianapolis was ordered by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to proceed to Guam, to discharge certain personnel and to report to the Port Director, Guam, for onward routing to Leyte, there to report for duty by despatch to Vice Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, U.S.N., who was then off Okinawa.
The routine procedure at Guam in July, 1945, in connection with the issuing of routing instructions, was for the Commanding Officer of the routed unit to receive his briefing from the Port Director at the Naval Operating Base, Guam. Routing Officers and Operations Officers were supplied with the information which it was believed was necessary for them to accomplish their mission.
On July 27, Captain C.B. McVay, III, U.S.N., commanding officer of the Indianapolis, visited the Office of the Port Director, Guam in connection with his routing to Leyte. Later that day the Navigator of the Indianapolis also visited the Port Director's office to obtain the Routing Instructions and discuss their details. Information of possible enemy submarines along the route was contained in the routing instructions and was discussed with the Navigator.
The route over which the Indianapolis was to travel, which was the only direct route between Guam and Leyte, and was the route regularly assigned vessels making passage between these islands, was considered within the acceptable risk limit for combatant vessels. Circuitous routes were available from Guam to Leyte, but no special apprehension was felt regarding the use of the direct route by the Indianapolis and no other route was considered.
The speed of advance of the Indianapolis (15.7 knots) was set by Captain McVay and was based upon his desire to arrive off the entrance to Leyte Gulf at daylight on July 31 in order to conduct antiaircraft practice prior to his entering the Gulf. To have arrived a day earlier would have required a speed of advance of about 24 knots. No special consideration was given the possibility of delaying the departure of the ship from Guam in order to enable her to proceed in company with other vessels, since the route assigned was not thought by the Port Director to be unduly hazardous. Zigzagging was, by his routing instructions, left to the discretion of Captain McVay. However, tactical orders then in force required zigzagging in conditions of good visibility, in waters where enemy submarines might be present.
The policy determination with regard to the escorting of vessels in the Western Pacific was the function of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. This policy, which required the escorting of vessels in some areas but dispensed with escorts for some classes of vessels in others, which were less active, was largely dictated by the limited availability of escort vessels. At the time of the sailing of the Indianapolis, there was a shortage in this regard and escorts were, as a rule, not given combatant vessels which were capable of "taking care of themselves." The Indianapolis was considered to be in this class and escort, if furnished her, would have been at the expense of other requirements of greater urgency.
At the time of her departure from Guam, the Indianapolis was not at peak efficiency; but she was well organized; her personnel were well disciplined and, in the main, well versed in the performance of their routine duties. Training of personnel was continuing and her visit to Leyte was being made in order to complete her refresher training program.
Early in the morning, at 12:15 A.M., on July 30, while the Indianapolis was steaming unescorted, and not zigzagging, at a speed of 17 knots through the water, under good conditions of visibility and in a moderate sea, two heavy explosions occurred against her starboard side forward, as a result of which explosions the ship capsized and sank between 12:27 and 12:30 A.M., July 30. The ship sank 12 minutes after the torpedoes hit.
No enemy vessel was sighted either before the explosions occurred or afterward. Watches were properly stood and good lookout was kept, both visual and radar. Normal precautions were being taken against enemy submarines. The lookouts were generally experienced men and fully alert. The damage control party, though well organized, was unable to function properly due to the heavy personnel casualties forward, the rapid flooding and the intense fire which was started in the forward section of the ship.
The communication set-up and provisions made for sending emergency messages were in accordance with good practice and current instructions. There is ample evidence that distress messages were keyed by radio operators and possibly were actually transmitted on at least one (500 k.c.) and possibly two frequencies. No evidence has been developed that any distress message from the ship was received by any ship, aircraft or shore station.
Orders to abandon ship were given by some officers locally, but general word to that effect was not passed throughout the ship. This was partly due to the disruption of all mechanical and electrical means of communication. Word for all hands to go on deck was passed through some of the lower deck compartments by the boatswain's mate of the watch, but was heard by only a few of the survivors. Many men stood by their abandon ship stations until they were forced by the listing of the ship to enter the water. Much lifesaving equipment went down with the ship.
The conduct of Captain McVay and of the other officers and men of the ship was, in the face of this emergency, satisfactory. Captain McVay did not order abandon ship when it was first suggested by the First Lieutenant. Shortly thereafter, the Executive Officer recommended abandoning ship. The Captain, approving this recommendation, ordered the word to be passed to all hands to abandon ship.
While some life rafts and floater nets were available to those in the water, many men had only their life jackets.
Correct maintenance routines for emergency equipment had been in effect. The life- saving equipment was the best type developed for surface ships and was identical with that supplied other vessels of the Indianapolis class.
Numerous acts of heroism and leadership and display of fortitude have been reported.
In the Headquarters of Commander Marianas on Guam and of the Commander Philippine Sea Frontier on Leyte, operations plotting boards were kept. On these boards was kept a graphic plot of the positions at sea of all vessels in which the headquarters concerned was interested. In the case of the Indianapolis, the departure of the vessel from Guam on July 28 was recorded on the plotting boards in each of these headquarters. Her estimated position was plotted on each board daily. On July 31, the date on which the vessel was scheduled to have arrived at Leyte, the Indianapolis was removed from the board in the headquarters of Commander Marianas and was recorded on the board at the headquarters of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier as having arrived at Leyte. This was the routine method of handling the plot of combatant vessels. Since, in accordance with orders standard throughout the Southwest Pacific Area, the Pacific Ocean Areas, and the Atlantic, the arrival of combatant vessels was not reported, vessels of t